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Anna Johnston* 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation: 
An Unsurprising Loss for Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives and an Erosion of Power for 
Administrative Agencies 
I. Introduction 
In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation,1 the Supreme Court 
deliberated whether pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) were exempted 
from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime pay requirement, and whether 
the Department of Labor’s (Department) opinion set forth in an amicus brief on 
the issue was owed controlling deference.2 The Court held that the Department was 
not owed controlling deference3 and that the outside salesman exemption to 
overtime pay applied to PSRs.4 
The Court’s emphasis on the element of “fair warning” in determining the level 
of deference owed to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations erodes administrative agencies’ interpretative power when it matters 
and preserves that power when it does not. The majority opinion degrades 
administrative agencies’ previously-recognized ability to offer controlling 
interpretations in legal briefs.5 The Court effectively limited Auer deference6 to only 
official interpretations that pre-date the challenged issue or those interpretations of 
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 1. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).  
 2. Id. at 2165. 
 3. Id. at 2168–69 (holding that the Department was not owed controlling deference as to the regulations it 
validly promulgated); see also infra Part III.C.1. 
 4. Id. at 2174. 
 5. See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878 (2011) (“[W]e conclude that the text of the 
regulation is ambiguous, and that deference is warranted to the interpretation of that text advanced by the 
Board in its amicus brief.”). 
 6. See infra Part III.C.1. 
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clear regulations. Accordingly, the Christopher decision proscribes Auer deference 
from agency interpretations in amicus briefs of ambiguous regulations that have 
multiple reasonable interpretations. 
II. The Case 
Plaintiffs Michael Shane Christopher and Frank Buchanan worked for 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) as PSRs. They were responsible for marketing and 
promoting GSK products to physicians and encouraging physicians to prescribe 
GSK products to their patients (commonly called “detailing” in the industry).7 As 
PSRs employed by GSK, the Plaintiffs received extensive specialized training. The 
training included how to: drive sales for each promoted drug, organize sales calls to 
maximize results, and sell through customer-focused dialogue in order to get the 
best possible commitment to prescribe.8 A PSR’s salary can be as much as $100,000 
a year, generally composed of seventy-five percent base salary and twenty-five 
percent incentive compensation.9 While it is not possible to link a PSR’s detailing 
activities to a particular patient filling a prescription, incentive pay in the form of 
commission is partly based on the number of prescriptions written by physicians in 
a PSR’s assigned geographic region.10 
The Plaintiffs asserted that they regularly worked over forty hours per week 
without receiving overtime compensation, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 
207.11 The Plaintiffs contended that their job consisted of primarily promotional or 
educational work, not selling; the Plaintiffs cited regulations prohibiting the direct 
sale of prescription drugs to support their claim that they cannot conduct sales 
within the meaning of the FLSA, and therefore could not be exempt from overtime 
pay as outside salesmen.12 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that the outside 
salesman exemption applied and granted the pharmaceutical company’s motion for 
 
 7. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, 
at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009), aff’d, 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). The employees 
spent a majority of their time away from their employer’s offices because they were out meeting with physicians. 
Id. at *3. 
 8. Id. at *6. 
 9. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 388 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08 Civ. 1498 
(FJM), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009)); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009), aff’d, 635 
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). Plaintiffs’ incentive compensation ranged from twenty-
six percent to forty-one percent of their total annual compensation. Id. at 7. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at *2. 
 12. Id. at *7–8. When meeting with physicians, PSRs are confined to scripts and “core messages” that are 
created by the company, in order to stay within the confines of federal law regulating the drugs. Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
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summary judgment.13 After reviewing PSRs’ duties and payment structure, the court 
concluded that, in such a highly regulated industry, obtaining a commitment from 
physicians to prescribe the marketed product is the closest PSRs can get to selling 
prescription drugs.14 The court relied upon the fact that the FLSA and the 
Department’s regulations broadly define “sale.”15 Additionally, the court noted that 
all of the reasons for exempting outside salesmen from overtime pay were 
applicable to PSRs.16 
Three months later, the district court ruled on the Plaintiff’s motion to amend 
the judgment. The Plaintiffs filed a copy of the Department’s amicus brief from a 
similar case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit17 and 
contended that the position taken by the Department was owed controlling 
deference in the case before the district court. (Courts apply the standards set forth 
in Chevron, Auer, and Skidmore to determine what level of deference an agency’s 
opinion is owed.18) The district court found that the Department was not entitled to 
Chevron deference because the opinion was in an amicus brief and not in a 
regulation promulgated in accordance with the notice-and-comment procedures 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.19 The district court further reasoned 
that the amicus brief was not owed Auer deference because the regulations simply 
restated the terms of the statute, and the court concluded that the Department had 
no special authority to interpret its own regulations in that instance.20 
 
 13. Christopher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *14. 
 14. Id. at *13–14. 
 15. Id. at *13. 
 16. Id. at *14. 
 17. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, In re Novartis 
Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-0437-cv). In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation 
considered whether either the administrative employee exemption or the outside salesman exemption apply to 
PSRs and was argued in the Second Circuit in February of 2010. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 
141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); see also infra 
Part III.C.  
 18. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 
452 (1997); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Administrative deference is of three different types: 
1) Chevron deference is applied to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, and the agency interpretation 
of the statute in question is generally binding on the court; 2) Auer deference is also a controlling deference and 
is applied to agency interpretations of the agency’s own ambiguous regulations; 3) Skidmore deference is a low-
level, non-binding deference that simply recognizes that an agency has expertise and a policy setting role. See 
infra Part III.C.1. 
 19. Christopher, No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12813, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 1, 2010). 
 20. Id. at *3; see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those 
in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”). But see Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (explaining that the fact that the Department’s interpretation came in the 
form of a legal brief did not, under the circumstances of the case, make it unworthy of deference). 
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The district court’s decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
where the Secretary of the Department of Labor filed a brief as amicus curiae in 
support of Christopher and Buchanan.21 The Department opined that while PSRs’ 
work might resemble selling, they do not in fact make sales because the actual sale 
of prescription drugs occurs “between the company and distributors (and then to 
the pharmacy).”22 The Department concluded that PSRs only engage in non-exempt 
promotional work — work that is incidental to sales, not in conjunction with sales, 
because PSRs cannot “sell” drugs — and therefore PSRs cannot meet the primary 
duties test for the outside salesman exemption.23 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Department’s opinion and affirmed the 
district court’s decision that PSRs are not entitled to overtime pay. The Ninth 
Circuit determined that the Department was not owed deference and that PSRs are 
exempted from overtime pay as outside salesmen.24 The court determined the 
Department’s opinion could not be owed Chevron deference because the opinion 
was unreasonable. The court then relied on Gonzales v. Oregon to determine that 
the Department was not owed even Auer deference.25 The court reasoned that when 
an agency merely paraphrases statutory language, instead of using its expertise and 
experience to formulate a regulation, the agency is not entitled to deference to 
interpret its own words.26 Additionally, the court found that the Department’s brief 
was a re-interpretation of the FLSA language.27 Therefore, the Department’s opinion 
was not owed even low-level Skidmore deference.28 
 
 21. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); 
Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-15257). 
 22. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 21, at 10. The relevant regulations define sales as “the transfer of title 
to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible property . . . .” 29 
C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012); Brief for the Secretary, supra note 21, at 8. 
 23. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 21, at 8–9; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (2012) (“Promotion work 
is one type of activity often performed by persons who make sales, which may or may not be exempt outside 
sales work, depending upon the circumstances under which it is performed. Promotional work that is actually 
performed incidental to and in conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or solicitations is exempt 
work. On the other hand, promotional work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone else is 
not exempt outside sales work.”). 
 24. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 392 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 
(2012) (holding the Department was not owed any deference); id. at 385 (holding the outside salesman 
exemption applied). The court did not address the administrative employee exemption since the issue was not 
raised on appeal. 
 25. See id. at 392, 395 & n.7 (finding the Department’s interpretation unpersuasive); id. at 394–95 (citing 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006)).  
 26. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 393–94. 
 27. Id. at 395. 
 28. Id. at 400. Not all justices believe in the merits of Skidmore deference. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 & n.6 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that the 
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In addition to finding the Department’s opinion was not owed any deference, 
the Ninth Circuit also explained why the Department’s position was unacceptable. 
The court noted that the Department’s seventy years of acquiescence to the 
pharmaceutical industry’s practice of not paying overtime wages supported a 
finding that PSRs are not entitled to it.29 The court went on to hold that the outside 
salesman exemption applied to PSRs.30 In support of that decision, the court 
recognized that the FLSA is ambiguous given that it is not an industry specific 
statute.31 Therefore, the court reasoned that under the FLSA a PSR’s role in 
obtaining commitments to prescribe was more akin to selling than promoting.32 
Additionally, the commission-based compensation scheme further supported a 
finding that PSRs were indeed selling.33 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari to determine 
how much deference is owed to the Department’s opinion and whether the outside 
salesman exemption applied to PSRs.34 
III. Legal Background 
A combination of statutes and regulations govern whether or not PSRs are entitled 
to overtime pay. The FLSA is a broad, generally applicable, remedial statute that 
requires overtime pay for employees who work over forty hours a week, with 
limited exceptions.35 There are two FLSA exemptions that are potentially relevant to 
PSRs: 1) the administrative employee exemption, and 2) the outside salesman 
exemption.36 Congress did not define these exemptions, but rather gave the 
Department the authority to define and delimit the exemptions by regulation.37 The 
FLSA was drafted in a generally applicable, broad fashion that was legislatively 
convenient, but makes it difficult to apply to non-traditional jobs and employment 
 
majority opinion applied “so-called Skidmore deference” and in a footnote, expounding that “this doctrine (if it 
can be called that) is incoherent, both linguistically and practically”). 
 29. Id. at 399. 
 30. Id. at 401. 
 31. Id. at 398. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011). 
 35. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2006). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).  
 37. Id. (establishing the outside salesman exemption and stating that it shall be “defined and delimited 
from time to time by regulations of the Secretary”); 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2006) (naming the Department of Labor as 
the administrator of the FLSA). There is almost no legislative history related to the exemptions, which have 
been part of the FLSA since its enactment. See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, 
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22123 (Apr. 23, 
2004) (“Although section 13(a)(1) was included in the original FLSA enacted in 1938, specific references to the 
exemptions in the legislative history are scant.”).  
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schemes.38 For example, there are many statutes regulating prescription drugs that 
constrain how PSRs can perform their job duties, which create legal anomalies that 
are not present in standard employment scenarios.39 These abnormalities make 
applying the FLSA to PSRs difficult. Indeed, notwithstanding the regulations 
promulgated by the Department explaining these exemptions, three federal circuit 
courts disagreed over whether PSRs were exempt as either administrative employees 
or outside salesmen.40 Furthermore, the courts disagreed about how much 
deference was owed to the Department’s opinion about the applicability of the 
exemptions to PSRs.41 
A. The FLSA Unequivocally Governs Overtime Compensation but Is Not Readily 
Applicable to Non-Traditional Employees 
The FLSA requires employers to compensate employees who work longer than forty 
hours a week with time-and-a-half overtime pay.42 There are two exemptions to the 
FLSA’s overtime pay requirement that could apply to PSRs: (1) the outside 
salesman exemption, which exempts employees who primarily sell products away 
from their employer’s place of business;43 and (2) the administrative employee 
exemption, which exempts high income-earning employees who have management 
or business operations oriented jobs.44 Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Christopher, there was a three-way circuit split regarding whether either of these 
two exemptions applied to PSRs.45 It is important to note that only one exemption 
need apply to PSRs in order preclude overtime pay. 
 
 38. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 398 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 
(2012) (explaining that the FLSA is not an industry-specific statute so it is important to consider the legislative 
intent of the provisions).  
 39. See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 40. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 385 (holding that PSRs are exempt as outside salesmen); In re Novartis Wage & 
Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. 
Ct. 2156 (2012) (holding that PSRs are not exempt as either administrative employees or outside salesmen); 
Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that PSRs are exempt as administrative 
employees). 
 41. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 393–94; In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d at 153; see also infra notes 
76–86 and accompanying text. The Department did not file a brief in the Third Circuit case Smith v. Johnson & 
Johnson.  
 42. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2006). The FLSA was originally enacted to 
protect the working class from treatment and quality of life by requiring a minimum wage and overtime pay 
after forty hours of work. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message from the President of the United States, H.R. DOC. NO. 
255, at 1–2 (1937). Congress delegated the task of defining these exemptions to the Department of Labor, which 
has from time to time enacted regulations defining and explaining these exemptions. The Department enforces 
both their regulations and the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006). 
 43. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (2012). 
 44. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 45. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text; infra Parts III.B–C. 
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The broad applicability of the FLSA makes it difficult to apply to PSRs. These 
employees resemble outside salesmen — the word “sales” is even included in their 
title — but they are explicitly prohibited by federal law from “selling” prescription 
drugs directly to physicians.46 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act governs 
prescription drug sales, distribution, and advertisements, in addition to 
communications about prescription drugs.47 The restrictions imposed by these laws 
limit the conduct of pharmaceutical companies and PSRs and complicate the 
analysis of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives actually sell. The FLSA, 
however, provides little to no guidance as to how this complex statutory and 
regulatory scheme affects the outside salesman exemption. The FLSA broadly 
defines sales as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment 
for sale, or other disposition.”48 
B. The Department of Labor Has Promulgated Rules to Explain and Expand the 
FLSA’s Exemptions to Overtime Pay 
Because the FLSA is a statute intended to have widespread applicability, the 
Department is charged with promulgating regulations to define and explain the 
exemptions to the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement.49 The Department has 
promulgated regulations about the outside salesman exemption50 and the 
administrative employee exemption,51 which the Department updated in 2004.52 
 
 46. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(c) (2006) (“No person may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to sell, purchase, or 
trade any drug sample, . . . coupon, . . . [or prescription drug] . . . .”); § 353(d) (regulating the distribution of 
drug samples). 
 47. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2006); see 21 U.S.C. §353(c) 
(establishing that no person may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to sell, purchase, or trade any drug sample, 
coupon, or drug limited to prescriptions); see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(d) (regulating the distribution of drug 
samples); see also Laws, Regulations, Guidances, and Enforcement Actions, FDA (last updated Apr. 30, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugMarketingAdvertisi
ngandCommunications/ucm081617.htm. These laws are so extensive they even regulate drug samples and 
coupons. 21 U.S.C. § 353(c). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2006). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (delegating the task of defining the exemptions to the Secretary of the 
Department of Labor). 
 50. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.500–541.504 (2012). 
 51. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200–541.204 (2012). 
 52. Before this, the regulations have not been substantially changed in fifty years, and attempts to update 
them in the last twenty years have been extremely controversial. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for 
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22124–25 
(2004). While there were significant structural changes to the rules, in many ways the new regulations are 
substantively similar to the previous regulations, and do not represent a major change in overtime regulations. 
For example, two new alternative tests were proposed, but ultimately rejected, for the administrative positions 
exemption: the “position of responsibility” and “high level of skill or training” tests. The Final Rule retained the 
existing requirement that exempt administrative employees must exercise discretion and independent 
judgment. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and 
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1. Outside Salesman Exemption 
The outside salesman exemption has two requirements. First, the employee must 
have a primary duty to either make “sales,” as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(k), or to 
acquire orders or contracts for services for consideration paid by the customer.53 
Second, the employee must customarily and regularly perform work away from the 
employer’s office.54 
The contested requirement of this exemption is whether PSRs “sell.” Both the 
statutory and regulatory definitions broadly define the term to include “any sale, 
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other 
disposition.”55 The regulations build on the statutory definition by stating: “Sales 
within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible 
property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible 
property.”56 The Department’s Final Rule did not clarify the definition of sales, 
explaining only “that the employee [must have], in some sense, . . . made sales.”57 
There is limited other relevant guidance to determine whether PSRs make sales. 
Generally, the Department has explained that if an employee has a primary duty of 
obtaining a commitment to buy from a customer and is credited with the sale, then 
the employee is selling.58 The Department has also provided that technological 
changes in how orders are placed should not ultimately determine whether an 
employee is selling, but the Final Rule did not discuss how regulatory limitations on 
prescription drugs affect how “orders” must necessarily happen in the 
 
Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22123. One significant change, however, was the adoption of a single duties 
test. The new regulations adopted a single standard duties test for each exemption category. 69 Fed. Reg. at 
22126. 
 53. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1)(i)–(ii). The FLSA defines “sale” or “sell” to include “any sale, exchange, 
contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2006). 
 54. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(2). This is the “outside” component of the outside salesman exemption. The 
proposed regulations for the 2004 Rules required the employer to perform work unrelated to outside sales for 
more than twenty percent of the hours worked in a workweek by nonexempt employees of the employer. 69 
Fed. Reg. at 22160. The Department decided that the primary duty test was preferable to the twenty percent 
tolerance test. Id. at 22161. 
 55. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for 
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (“Sales within the meaning of section 
3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable 
evidences of intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, exchange, 
contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”). 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). 
 57. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162 (emphasis added). 
 58. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162–63. This statement was made within the context of buyer-consumers placing 
orders with a company directly because exempt status should not depend on whether it is the sales employee or 
the customer who types the order into a computer system and hits the return button. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162–63. 
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pharmaceutical industry.59 Lastly, the regulations distinguish promotional work 
performed by an employee that is incidental to and in conjunction with sales or 
solicitations, from promotional work that is designed to stimulate sales in general. 
Work performed incidental to and in conjunction with sales is exempted work (and 
considered to be part of sales), but work designed to stimulate sales in general is not 
exempted work.60 
2. The Components of the Administrative Employee Exemption and How the Third 
Circuit Applied the Exemption to PSRs 
The administrative employee exemption applies to an “employee employed in a 
bona fide . . . administrative . . . capacity . . . .”61 The regulation explaining the 
administrative employee exemption promulgated by the Department has three 
major components. First, the employee must earn more than $455 per week.62 
Second, the employee must have a primary duty of performing “office or non-
manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of 
the employer or the employer’s customers.”63 Third, the employee’s primary duty 
from the second requirement must involve the “exercise of discretion and 
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.”64 Furthermore, in 
order to be directly related to the management or general business operations, the 
work must directly relate “to assisting with the running or servicing of the 
business,” as opposed to selling a product in a store.65 Examples of such work 
include, but are not limited to, advertising, marketing, and public relations.66 
The regulations explain what it means to exercise “discretion and independent 
judgment with respect to matters of significance.”67 This requirement establishes the 
relative importance of the employee’s work, and establishes several factors that can 
be used to evaluate the discretionary nature of the work: whether the employee has 
authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement management policies or 
 
 59. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162–63 (“[T]he Department agrees that technological changes in how orders are 
taken and processed should not preclude the exemption for employees who in some sense make the sales.”). 
Pharmaceutical companies use “detailers” (or PSRs) to promote their prescription drugs by providing 
information to physicians about the company’s drugs in hopes of persuading the physicians to write 
prescriptions for the products to their patients in appropriate cases. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2659 (2011) (describing the process of “detailing”). Patients ultimately purchase these prescriptions at a 
pharmacy, which receives the drugs from the manufacturer. 
 60. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2012). 
 61. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). 
 62. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(1) (2012). 
 63. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2). 
 64. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3). 
 65. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2012). 
 66. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b). 
 67. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202 (2012). 
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operating practices; whether the employee carries out major assignments in 
conducting the operations of the business; and whether the employee has authority 
to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without prior 
approval.68 In summation, the employee must have the “authority to make an 
independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision.”69 
The Third Circuit applied these regulations to PSRs in Smith v. Johnson & 
Johnson and held that PSRs were exempted from overtime pay as administrative 
employees, based on the determination that that PSRs’ jobs had sufficient 
independent and managerial qualities to satisfy the exemption’s requirements.70 In 
coming to this conclusion, the court noted that the FLSA is construed broadly as a 
remedial statute and exemptions to it are construed narrowly against the 
employer.71 
In Smith, the parties both agreed that Smith’s salary met the minimum 
requirement for the administrative employee exemption, and the dispute between 
the parties was over the nature and execution of Smith’s duties.72 The court relied 
on Smith’s testimony about the managerial and independent qualities of her 
position to conclude that her job satisfied the other two requirements. The court 
determined that Smith’s position “directly related to the management or general 
business operations of the employer” because her non-manual position required 
her to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her territory.73 These tasks 
“involved a high level of planning and foresight, and the strategic plan guided the 
 
 68. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a) (explaining the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to 
matters of significance). Section 541.202 clarifies the definition of discretion and independent judgment to 
reflect existing federal case law and to eliminate outdated and confusing language in the existing interpretive 
guidelines. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 22142; 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b) (laying out the factors). 
 69. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c). 
 70. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010). In Smith, the only issue addressed by 
the Third Circuit was whether the administrative employee exemption applied to pharmaceutical sales 
representatives. Id. at 286 n.4. The district court found the outside salesman exemption did not apply. Smith v. 
Johnson & Johnson, No. 06-4787 (JLL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104952 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2008), order aff’d, appeal 
dismissed, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010), at *21. 
 71. Smith, 593 F.3d at 284 (citing Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)). This 
is a canon of construction for the FLSA because it is a remedial statute designed to improve wages and working 
conditions; therefore, its provisions are to be construed broadly in favor of coverage. Tennessee Coal, Iron & 
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (explaining that portions of the FLSA are 
“remedial and humanitarian in purpose” and that “[s]uch a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a 
narrow, grudging manner”). 
 72. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2012) (requiring for the administrative employee exemption that an 
employee have a minimum salary of $455 per week, have a primary duty of performing office or non-manual 
worked directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s 
customers, and where the execution of that primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent 
judgment with respect to matters of significance). 
 73. Smith, 593 F.3d at 285.  
 Anna Johnston 
Vol. 8 2013 33 
execution of her remaining duties.”74 The court also found that Smith exercised 
discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in the 
performance of her duties because Smith worked without direct oversight and was 
“the manager of her own business who could run her own territory as she saw fit.”75 
C. The Second Circuit and the Department Agreed That Neither Exemption Applied to 
PSRs 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the second modern 
federal appellate court to address the issue of overtime pay for PSRs in In re 
Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation.76 For the first time, the Department joined the 
litigation by filing a brief as amicus curiae, arguing that neither exemption applied. 
The Department asserted that no sale occurred between PSRs and physicians and 
that PSRs did not exercise enough discretion and independent judgment.77 The 
Second Circuit held that the Department was owed controlling deference and that 
neither the administrative employee exemption nor the outside salesman 
exemption applied to PSRs.78 
1. Levels of Deference Owed to the Department When Interpreting Its Regulations 
There are three different kinds of administrative deference. First, Chevron deference 
applies to agency interpretations that carry out an express or implied delegation by 
Congress to the agency to interpret an ambiguous statute through rules carrying the 
force of law. Second, Auer deference applies to an agency interpretation of the 
agency’s own ambiguous regulations. Third, Skidmore deference is a low-level, non-
binding deference. 
Chevron deference applies when Congress has delegated legislative authority to 
an administrative agency to interpret an ambiguous statute through rules carrying 
the force of law. When administrative action is taken as an exercise of that 
legislative authority, the action is entitled to binding Chevron deference, unless the 
action was procedurally defective, substantively arbitrary or capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.79 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 77. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 78. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 143–44. 
 79. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Most cases where agency rules have received 
Chevron deference, those rules were subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 228, 230 (2001). However, there are a number of cases where Chevron deference has been applied 
even where notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures were not followed. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 590–91 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (listing cases in which the Court has accorded Chevron deference to authoritative agency 
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Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test to determine 
whether an agency’s interpretation is owed controlling deference.80 If Congress’s 
formulation of the statute clearly and directly addresses the issue, then the statute 
controls. However, if the statute is ambiguous, then the court must determine 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”81 So long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, the agency’s 
interpretation is owed controlling deference. 
Auer deference applies when an agency is interpreting its own ambiguous 
regulation using “the agency’s fair and considered judgment . . . .”82 Under Auer, an 
agency opinion in an amicus brief is owed controlling deference so long as the 
interpretation is not plainly erroneous or otherwise unreasonable.83 The 
interpretation may not be a “post hoc rationalization” to justify past agency action.84 
Finally, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court explained that Auer deference does not 
apply when an agency merely paraphrases statutory language in a regulation instead 
of using its expertise and experience to formulate regulations.85 
Agency interpretations that do not receive controlling deference under Chevron 
or Auer may still be “entitled to respect” under Skidmore. The amount of deference 
applied under Skidmore depends on the thoroughness of the agency’s 
considerations, the validity of its reasoning, the consistency of the interpretation 
with past agency opinions and actions, and all other factors which give it the “power 
to persuade.”86 
 
positions). The Court has explicitly acknowledged that notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures are not 
required to be awarded Chevron deference. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230–31. 
 80. 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 81. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 82. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). 
 83. Id. at 461–62 (explaining that the fact the Department’s reasonable interpretation came in the form of a 
legal brief did not, under the circumstances of the case, make it unworthy of controlling deference, combined 
with the fact it was not plainly erroneous); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878 (2011). But see 
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (explaining that agency interpretations that lack the force of law — such as those 
“contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines” — “do not warrant Chevron-
style [controlling] deference”). 
 84. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)). The 
existence of other regulations, rulings, or administrative practices that are consistent with the interpretation 
weigh in favor of an interpretation meriting Auer deference. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212. 
 85. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special authority to 
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has 
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). 
 86. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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2. The Second Circuit Held That the Department’s Opinion That Neither Exemption 
Applied Is Owed Controlling Deference 
The Second Circuit held the Department’s interpretation for both exemptions was 
owed Auer deference because an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is 
generally entitled to controlling deference.87 The court reasoned that neither the 
outside salesman exemption nor the administrative employee exemption applied 
because federal law prohibits PSRs from selling prescription drugs and there was 
“no evidence in the record that [PSRs] have any authority to formulate, affect, 
interpret, or implement Novartis’s management policies or its operating 
practices . . . .”88 Additionally, the court noted that, in general, exemptions to the 
FLSA overtime requirement were to be narrowly construed against the employer.89 
The Department of Labor sided with the PSRs and argued the exemptions did 
not apply to PSRs, thereby requiring employers to pay overtime under the FLSA. 
Firstly, the Department explained that the FLSA’s “exemptions are to be narrowly 
construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application 
limited to those [cases] plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.”90 
Secondly, the Department argued that its opinion was owed Auer deference despite 
that it was presented in an amicus brief.91 
The Department argued the administrative employee exemption could not apply 
to PSRs because the exercise of discretion and independent judgment must be more 
 
 87. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). In Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, the 
court acknowledged that the Secretary’s regulations have controlling weight under Chevron, unless found to be 
arbitrary and capricious. 593 F.3d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the Department did not file an amicus 
brief in that case and therefore the court did not consider the Department’s opinion about whether PSRs 
specifically are eligible for overtime pay. 
 88. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 156. Novartis did not show the PSRs were allowed discretion or independent 
judgment, since PSRs gained skills from Novartis trainings and were exercised with severe limits. Id. at 156–57. 
 89. Id. at 150 (quoting Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distributors, Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)). 
 90. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 7 (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 
(1960)) (alteration in the brief). 
 91. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 7 n.3 (“To the extent that the plain language of the 
Department’s outside sales or administrative regulations are ambiguous, courts must give controlling deference 
to the Department’s interpretation of its own regulations unless such interpretation is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with those regulations.”); see Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (2008) 
(“Just as we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the first 
instance . . . the agency is entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations 
it has put in force. Under Auer, we accept the agency’s position unless it is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.’” (citations omitted)); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). This principle holds true 
whether the Department’s interpretation is found in a Preamble to a Final Rule published in the Federal 
Register, an opinion letter or other interpretive materials, or in a legal brief. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, 
Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007) (controlling deference given to Department’s Advisory Memorandum 
issued during the course of litigation); Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (controlling deference given to legal brief). 
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than the use of skill in applying well established techniques, procedures, or specific 
standards set forth by the employer in manuals or other sources.92 While PSRs work 
independently, determine what time of day to visit the physicians on their lists, and 
decide how best to execute their presentations, they do so within clearly and strictly 
prescribed parameters.93 For example, when promoting the drugs to physicians, 
PSRs are not allowed to deviate from the “core message” found in the scripts, 
manuals, brochures, and other materials provided by the employer.94 If PSRs do not 
have a scripted response to a physician’s question, they are required to either 
reiterate the “core message” or refer the physician to the employer’s medical 
experts.95 The Department contended that an employee so tightly constrained 
cannot exercise discretion and independent judgment.96 
The Department also argued PSRs do not qualify for the outside salesman 
exemption. The Department contended that while PSRs’ work might resemble 
selling, they do not in fact make sales, as the actual sale of the drugs occurs between 
the company and distributors (and then to the pharmacy).97 The regulations defined 
sales as “the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible 
and valuable evidences of intangible property.”98 The Department concluded that 
PSRs only engage in non-exempt promotional work and, therefore, do not satisfy 
the primary duties test for the outside salesman exemption.99 
IV. The Court’s Reasoning 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the judgment of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the “petitioners qualify as outside salesmen 
under the most reasonable interpretation of the [Department]’s regulations.”100 
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the Department was owed 
controlling deference for the opinion set forth in its amicus brief: that an employee 
does not make a “sale” for the purposes of the outside salesman exemption unless 
the employee actually transfers title to the property at issue.101 First, the Court 
recognized that agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations usually receive 
 
 92. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e) (2012); see also Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 19. 
 93. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 21. 
 94. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 6. 
 95. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 4 n.2 (“If a Rep does not have a scripted response from NPC to 
a physician’s concerns, she must try to ‘sidestep’ the question by restating the ‘core message’ or refer the 
physician to medical experts and NPC.” (citation omitted)). 
 96. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 6.  
 97. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 3 n.1. 
 98. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012); see also Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 8–10. 
 99. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
 100. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2174 (2012).  
 101. Id. at 2166. 
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controlling Auer deference, even when advanced in a legal brief.102 The Court, 
however, rejected the Department’s interpretation. The Court concluded that 
allowing this interpretation of an ambiguous regulation to retroactively apply to 
conduct pre-dating that interpretation “would seriously undermine the principle 
that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a 
regulation] prohibits or requires.’”103 The Court noted that the industry had treated 
PSRs as non-exempt employees for decades and the Department had never taken 
any enforcement action against any pharmaceutical company.104 Fearing the 
potential for agencies to promulgate “vague and open-ended regulations that they 
[could] later interpret as they see fit,” the Court declined to extend Auer 
deference.105 
The Court applied Skidmore deference, which accords agencies a level of 
deference consistent with the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade.”106 The Court found the 
Department’s opinion to be “quite unpersuasive,” as it “plainly lack[ed] the 
hallmarks of thorough consideration.”107 Explicitly, the Court took issue with the 
fact that the Department’s reasoning for its position had changed over the course of 
the litigation in the Second and Ninth Circuits and then before the Court.108 The 
Court determined the Department’s title transfer theory was “flatly inconsistent” 
with the “consignment for sale” definition of “sale” within the FLSA.109 
Finding the Department’s opinion was entitled to no deference, the Court 
turned to traditional methods of statutory interpretation and used a textual analysis 
to determine that Christopher and Buchanan were indeed exempted from overtime 
 
 102. Id. at 2166 (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).  
 103. Id. at 2167 (citing Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.)) 
(alteration in Court opinion). 
 104. Id. at 2168.  
 105. Id. It is plausible that agencies are intentionally drafting “vague and open-ended regulations” as an 
enforcement strategy due to limited budgets.  
 106. Id. at 2168–69 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))). 
 107. Id. at 2169; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that the factors to 
evaluate when determining deference owed to an administrative opinion include: “the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).  
 108. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169 (“[T]he DOL first announced its view that pharmaceutical sales 
representatives do not qualify as outside salesmen in a series of amicus briefs, there was no opportunity for 
public comment, and the interpretation that initially emerged from the Department’s internal decisionmaking 
process proved to be untenable. After arguing successfully in the Second Circuit and then unsuccessfully in the 
Ninth Circuit that a sale for present purposes simply requires a ‘consummated transaction,’ the DOL advanced 
a different interpretation in this Court.”). 
 109. Id.  
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pay as outside salesmen.110 The Court began by analyzing the FLSA statutory 
provision establishing the exemption.111 The Court found the word “capacity” of 
particular importance. The intentional use of “capacity” suggested a “functional, 
rather than formal, inquiry.”112 The Court further noted that the Department 
adopted the statutory definition of “sale,” which was a non-exclusive list of 
examples of “sales.”113 The Court emphasized that the words “any” and “other 
disposition” in the statutory definition demonstrated Congress’s intent to include a 
wide range of “sales” under the exemption.114 Finally, the Court concluded that 
petitioners were “selling.” The Court reasoned that the petitioners made sales 
within the meaning of the FLSA by obtaining a commitment to prescribe, the only 
way “selling” can exist in the pharmaceutical industry.115 
In support of its conclusion, the Court also noted that the petitioners bore the 
“external indicia” of outside salesmen, because the petitioners: (1) “were trained to 
close each sales call by obtaining the maximum commitment possible from the 
physician;” (2) “worked away from the office, with minimal supervision;” and (3) 
“were rewarded for their efforts with incentive compensation.”116 The Court found 
further support for its conclusion due to the nature of the petitioners’ jobs and 
salaries. Specifically, their work was difficult to standardize to a particular time 
frame, making them unlike typical hourly workers entitled to overtime pay, and 
they earned salaries well above the minimum wage.117 Overall the Court proclaimed 
PSRs are “hardly the kind of employees that the FLSA was intended to protect.”118 
The dissenting opinion (authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) agreed with the majority opinion on the issue 
that the Department was owed no deference.119 The dissenting opinion disagreed 
with the majority’s conclusions that obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a 
physician was “selling” and that a “sale” could happen between a PSR and a 
 
 110. Id. at 2170–73 (analyzing the text of the FLSA and related regulations, focusing on the definition of 
“sale,” the modifier “any” in that definition, and the use of the broad catchall phrase: “other dispositions”). 
 111. Id. at 2170; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006) (“[A]ny employee employed . . . in the capacity of 
outside salesman . . . .”). 
 112. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170.  
 113. Id. at 2170–71; 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment 
for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”). 
 114. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170–71.  
 115. Id. at 2172 (“Obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a physician to prescribe one of respondent’s 
drugs is the most that petitioners were able to do to ensure the eventual disposition of the products that 
respondent sells.”). 
 116. Id. at 2172–73. 
 117. Id. at 2173. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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physician.120 The dissenters opined that the PSRs’ work was more comparable to 
“promotional activities designed to stimulate sales” and that the PSRs’ “primary 
duty” was to provide information, not sell.121 The dissenting Justices would have 
held that PSRs are not outside salesmen, and thus entitled to overtime pay.122 
V. Analysis 
The Court in Christopher reached the proper conclusion about whether the outside 
salesman exemption applies to PSRs, but did so in a way that eroded agencies’ 
previously-recognized ability to offer controlling administrative interpretations in 
legal briefs. The Court should have declined to apply controlling deference using 
Gonzales rather than emphasizing a “fair notice” standard. However, the 
Department’s opinion that PSRs were not outside salesmen was not sound given the 
Department’s other regulations and explanations of the exemption. Therefore, the 
Court’s ultimate conclusion that PSRs are exempted from overtime pay as outside 
salesmen was well founded. 
The impact of the Court’s decision is that, going forward, courts will be able to 
dismiss agency opinions using the “fair warning” standard simply because there are 
one or more permissible interpretations of an ambiguous regulation, and cite lack 
of notice as the basis for not awarding deference. The Court has effectively limited 
Auer deference to only those interpretations that pre-date the challenged issue or 
those interpretations based on clearly drafted regulations. As a result, Auer 
deference will not apply to agency opinions of ambiguous regulations, which is 
precisely when the agency’s opinion matters most. 
To demonstrate, the Christopher Court held that the Department’s opinion was 
not owed controlling deference regarding the applicability of the outside salesman 
exemption to PSRs due to lack of “fair notice” (when the Department’s regulations 
were ambiguous and basically restated the FLSA). Contrastingly, the Court would 
have found that the Department’s opinion as to the applicability of the 
administrative employee exemption would be owed Auer deference if it had granted 
review on a writ of certiorari to In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation. Because the 
administrative employee exemption regulations are very detailed and expand upon 
and explain the administrative employee exemption in the FLSA, the Department 
had garnered special authority to interpret them. By granting certiorari on the 
Ninth Circuit case as opposed to the Second Circuit decision, the Court avoided 
 
 120. Id. at 2176. Justice Breyer noted explained that sales in the pharmaceutical industry happened between 
the consumer and the pharmacist. Further, Justice Breyer noted that a patient may choose not to fill a 
prescription, or that a pharmacist may substitute a generic for the manufacturer’s drug. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2177–78. 
 122. Id. at 2179. On a practical note, some would not find it surprising that the four liberal justices decided 
that the exemption does not apply, thus making PSRs entitled to overtime pay. 
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clearly demonstrating the negative impact of its decision on the power of amici 
briefs by administrative agencies. 
A. By Limiting the Scope of Its Review the Supreme Court Hid the Deleterious 
Implications for Auer Deference for Administrative Agencies’ Amici Briefs 
The Court chose not to address whether PSRs qualified for the administrative 
employee exemption to overtime pay.123 The petition for writ of certiorari from the 
Second Circuit was denied after the Ninth Circuit decision was released.124 
Therefore, it is likely that the Supreme Court was aware of the three-way circuit 
split on the two exemptions and the deference issue when it denied the petition 
from the Second Circuit. 
By granting certiorari on the Ninth Circuit decision, the Court limited its review 
to only the issues of the outside salesman exemption and the level of deference 
owed to the Department on that specific exemption.125 While the Supreme Court 
decision on the applicability of the outside salesman exemption to PSRs resolved 
the practical question of whether PSRs are entitled to overtime pay, the Court 
avoided addressing the administrative employee exemption portion of the circuit 
split and downplayed the implication of its decision for the use of Auer deference in 
the future. 
B. The Department’s Opinion as to the Outside Sales Employee Exemption Is Not 
Owed Controlling Deference, but the Department’s Opinion Regarding the 
Administrative Employee Exemption Should Receive Auer Deference 
The Department is the administrator of the FLSA and properly promulgated 
regulations to define the exemptions established by statute.126 The regulations 
themselves are, therefore, at a minimum, awarded Chevron deference.127 However, 
 
 123. While a decision that at least one of the exemptions applied to PSRs resolved the immediate question of 
overtime pay, limiting the Court’s inquiry to only one exemption left the other half of the administrative 
deference question unanswered: what happens when the administrative regulations are clear? As the analysis 
section of the case note explains, the Court avoided clearly demonstrating of the impact of its decision: reducing 
the authority of agencies to advance interpretations of ambiguous regulations in legal briefs, exactly when 
agency opinion is needed most. 
 124. The Ninth Circuit issued their opinion on Feb. 14, 2011. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). The Supreme Court scheduled the Second Circuit 
case for conference Feb. 18, 2011 and Feb. 25, 2001, denying cert on February 28th. Docket No. 10-460, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-460.htm 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 125. See Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Lopes, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011) (denying the petition for writ of 
certiorari); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011). 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2006) (naming the Department of Labor as the administrator of the FLSA). 
 127. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2165.  
 Anna Johnston 
Vol. 8 2013 41 
the Court held the Department’s opinion in the brief about the outside salesman 
exemption was not entitled to controlling Auer deference, primarily because of the 
lack of “fair warning.”128 The concern of “post hoc rationalization”129 or contriving a 
“convenient litigating position”130 is not new. The administrative rulemaking 
process of requiring both notice and comment was created to specifically avoid it.131 
However, the Court did not need to expand this train of thought in order to decline 
to apply Auer deference.132 
The Court could and should have refused to apply Auer deference by using the 
reasoning set out in Gonzales. The regulation defining sales analyzed under the 
outside salesman exemption merely parrots the language of the FLSA,133 and the 
latter part of the regulation actually repeats the FLSA definition of sales.134 Because 
the regulation only reiterates the FLSA, rather than expanding upon what the FLSA 
states, the Department’s opinion was owed no deference under Gonzales.135 The 
result of the reasoning in the Christopher decision is that it will limit agencies’ 
previously-recognized ability to interpret ambiguous regulations in amici briefs 
when the interpretations are neither formally promulgated rules nor obviously 
based on the regulations themselves, defeating the purpose of this recognized ability 
to offer interpretations in briefs. This limitation is particularly unfortunate in a time 
of limited enforcement budgets given that amici briefs cost less money and utilize 
fewer resources. 
 
 128. Id. at 2167. 
 129. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). 
 130. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988). 
 131. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 
(2007)). Notice-and-comment procedures not only ensure fairness for regulated parties, but also operate as a 
check on agency-power. See Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2262 (2001) 
(explaining how the APA basically operates as a check on executive power “by subjecting [agencies’] most 
important lawmaking mechanisms — rulemakings and (especially) adjudications — to stringent procedural 
requirements”). 
 132. Auer deference is determined by a number of factors, or which “adequacy of notice to the regulated 
parties” is but one. Id. at 2167 (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991) (identifying “adequacy of 
notice to regulated parties” as one factor relevant to the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation)). 
 133. The regulation actually references the statutory definition. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1)(i) (2012) 
(explaining the employee must have a primary duty of “making sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the 
Act”). 
 134. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for 
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012) (“Sales within the meaning of 
section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and 
valuable evidences of intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, 
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”). 
 135. When an agency merely paraphrases statutory language in a regulation, instead of using its expertise 
and experience to formulate regulations which expand upon the statute, the agency does not acquire special 
authority to interpret its own words and is not owed any deference. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 
(2006). 
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In contrast, the administrative employee exemption demonstrates how an 
agency opinion in a legal brief might still be owed Auer deference after Christopher. 
An agency’s opinion will still be owed controlling deference when the regulations 
are clear on their face. For example, the regulations defining the administrative 
employee exemption expand upon the FLSA’s one time mention of employees 
“employed in a bona fide administrative capacity.” From this, the Department 
created a three-part test analyzing salary, nature of the work, and the execution of 
that work.136 The Department’s regulations are very specific as to the requirements 
of an exempted administrative employee, demonstrating that the regulations were 
formulated with the Department’s experience and expertise. In turn, this means the 
Department’s opinion that PSRs are not exempt should be owed controlling 
deference.137 
C. Outside Sales Employee Exemption Regulations Are Ambiguous, with Two 
Permissible Interpretations as Applied to PSRs, and Are Thus Inappropriate for Auer 
Deference Under Christopher 
The Court properly found that the outside salesman exemption applied to PSRs. 
The Court noted the broad definition of “sales” and how PSRs “sell” in the only way 
“selling” can exist in the pharmaceutical industry.138 The Court also noted other 
considerations, such as: how the nature of a PSR’s work is similar to the work of a 
traditional outside salesman, that a PSR’s salary and incentive pay do not warrant 
overtime pay, and that all the rationales for exempting an outside sales employee 
apply.139 However, the regulations promulgated by the Department offered little 
guidance on these issues, making Auer deference inapplicable to the Department’s 
amicus brief under Gonzales.140 
1. The Court Mistakenly Denied Auer Deference by Categorizing the Transfer of Title 
Interpretation as New When It Was Already Established and Reasonable Grounds 
Existed for Finding No Sale Occurs During PSR Detailing 
The regulations require outside salesmen to make “sales” and perform their work 
primarily outside the employer’s place of business (both obvious from the title of 
the exemption set forth in the FLSA).141 PSRs clearly meet the requirement of 
working primarily outside the employer’s place of business, because PSRs mostly 
 
 136. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2012).  
 137. See supra Part III.C. 
 138. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2174. 
 139. Id. at 2172–73, 2179. 
 140. See supra Part III.C. 
 141. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a) (2012). 
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work from home or are traveling to visit physicians.142 During this time, PSRs are 
largely unsupervised, like a typical outside sales employee.143 Therefore, the only 
issue for deliberation is whether PSRs “sell.”144 
It is not implausible to conclude that PSRs sell because selling is defined broadly 
by both the FLSA and regulations.145 As the Court noted, the definitions conclude 
with a catch-all, “or other disposition,” after a list of examples of selling.146 
However, it is a mischaracterization to say the Department’s title transfer theory 
was new and that, therefore, companies had no notice. In fact, the title transfer 
theory was the only addition made to the FLSA’s definition of “sales” in the 
regulatory definition.147 While transfer of title may appear “flatly inconsistent” with 
a definition of sales that include consignment for sales, that is not the case. The 
Court cites Sturm v. Boker to support the proposition that “‘consignment for sale’ 
does not involve the transfer of title.”148 This statement oversimplifies the issue. 
There is ultimately a transfer of title in consignment for sale, just not between the 
consignor and the consignee, but between the consignor and the buyer when the 
purchase occurs. 
A few reasons make it illogical for the Court to claim that the Department 
“[could] not salvage its [transfer of title] interpretation” by arguing that 
consignment for sale eventually results in a title transfer, because the same could be 
said of physician’s nonbinding commitment.149 First, this rationalization ignores the 
realities that a PSR’s interactions with physicians are not equivalent to those 
interactions that occur under consignment for sale. In a consignment analogy, the 
most logical assignment of roles to each party would be that the manufacturer 
would be the consignor, the pharmacy would be the consignee, and the patient-
purchaser would be the ultimate buyer. One might argue that PSRs are agents of the 
consignor and that physicians are consignees in the sense that the physicians 
operate in cooperation with pharmacists. However, the physician, the party 
 
 142. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 541.502 (2012). 
 143. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 207–08 (10th Cir. 1941) (explaining that a typical outside 
salesman works independently, receives commission as extra compensation, and “works away from his 
employer’s place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no 
way of knowing the number of hours he works per day”). 
 144. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 145. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for 
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012) (“Sales within the meaning of 
section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and 
valuable evidences of intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, 
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”). 
 146. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171. 
 147. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.  
 148. Id. at 2169 (citing Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 330 (1893)). 
 149. Id. 
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arguably being “sold” to by a PSR, is not involved in the title transfer. The 
consignees never receive title, and therefore no sale occurs between the PSR and 
physician under this analogy. 
Second, the consignment relationship is not when the sale occurs; the sale (and 
title transfer) occurs when the consignee sells to the purchaser. Indeed, the Sturm 
Court specifically explained that the term of the consignment was that “the 
property was committed or entrusted to [the consignee from the consignor] for 
care or sale, and did not by any express or fair implication mean the sale by the one 
or purchase by the other.”150 In PSR detailing, prescription drugs are never 
“committed or entrusted” to physicians and are certainly not “sold” by 
physicians.151 Put simply, pharmacies, not physicians, sell prescription drugs. 
The argument that title must ultimately transfer for a “sale” to occur is not fatal 
to the Department’s argument. In fact, this assertion proves the logic of the 
Department’s argument that PSRs do not sell to physicians. (The author recognizes 
that this conclusion is counterintuitive given the context of the Department’s other 
regulations and explanations of the outside salesman exemption, which appear to 
exempt PSRs from overtime pay.) Because the logic of the title transfer theory holds 
as applied to PSRs, the Court should have denied application of Auer deference 
using Gonzales rather than arguing the Department’s opinion was a novel and 
erroneous interpretation. 
2. The Court Accurately Concluded that PSRs Qualify as Outside Salesmen, a 
Permissible Result Because the Department’s Regulations Were Ambiguous 
The fact that the Department’s title theory is neither new nor incorrect does not 
indicate that PSRs cannot reasonably be said to “sell” under the FLSA and the 
Department’s ambiguous regulations. The argument set forth above merely 
demonstrates that the lack of “fair warning” emphasized by the Court was a 
misguided way to dismiss the Department’s authority to interpret an ambiguous 
regulation. The broad statutory and regulatory definitions include “selling” as it 
exists in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The Final Rule from the Department expansively defined sales by stating that the 
employer only has to prove “that the employee, in some sense, has made sales.”152 
Furthermore, the promotional aspect of a PSR’s job does not mean that a PSR is not 
selling. Detailing work is more than just promotional work to stimulate sales in 
general. Rather, detailing work is done to increase an individual PSR’s personal 
 
 150. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (emphasis added). 
 151. Physicians, more correctly put, recommend drugs by prescribing them, at which point patients can 
choose to purchase or not purchase, and even if they do, pharmacist may substitute a generic version of the 
drug. See supra note 120. 
 152. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162 (emphasis added). 
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success in obtaining a commitment to prescribe. Under the regulations, 
promotional work done in order to consummate an employee’s own “sales” are 
exempt from overtime pay.153 
The critical inquiry to determine if a PSR’s promotional work is exempt depends 
upon whether the promotional work involves obtaining a commitment to 
prescribe, which impacts a PSR’s commission. A physician’s lack of participation in 
the transfer is irrelevant to the issue. The determinative factor under the 
Department’s regulations is that PSRs are paid bonuses and commission based on 
their apparent success rates for obtaining commitments to prescribe in their 
respective regions. The Court also recognized PSRs received incentive 
compensation like traditional outside salesmen.154 
PSRs are also not the type of employee the FLSA sought to protect because of 
their salary and bonus compensation structure.155 Most PSRs earn sizeable incomes 
— as much as $100,000 a year — and are not “hourly workers” who work only forty 
hours a week.156 The regulations explicitly state that a highly compensated employee 
is more likely to be exempt from overtime pay.157 Furthermore, PSRs do not need 
overtime pay to fairly compensate them for their work. PSRs receive fair 
compensation for extra efforts through bonuses or commissions.158 Instead of 
receiving overtime pay, a PSR receives commission for good job performance or for 
extra work rendered, determined by the level of drug sales in their respective 
region.159 
 
 153. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2012) (“Promotional work that is actually performed incidental to and in 
conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or solicitations is exempt work.” (emphasis added)).  
 154. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2173 (2012).  
 155. Id. 
 156. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 388 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08 Civ. 1498 
(FJM), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009)). 
 157. “A high level of compensation is a strong indicator of an employee’s exempt status, thus eliminating 
the need for a detailed analysis of the employee’s job duties.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.601 (c) (2012). While this is quote 
from the part of the regulations for a separate highly compensated employee exemption (and exemption that is 
related to the administrative employee exemption), the logic nonetheless applies to all exemptions. The FLSA 
was enacted in order to protect underpaid and overworked working class. See Roosevelt, supra note 40 
(explaining how the FLSA will prevent “chiseling workers’ wagers [and] stretching workers’ hours”). If an 
employee is already being paid a large amount of money, that employees does not need overtime. PSRs earn an 
average of $91,500 a year, far above minimum wage. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 642. 
 158. PSRs earn an average of $91,500, where generally fifteen percent to twenty-five percent of that consists 
of “incentive pay.” In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642 (S.D.N.Y 2009), vacated and 
remanded by 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 
2156 (2012). 
 159. Bonuses are based on subscriptions generated within a PSR’s given region, but the data is not 100% 
accurate. It is impossible to track which physicians are responsible for the prescriptions and the employing 
pharmaceutical company only gets data from pharmacies which choose to report to them. In re Novartis Wage 
& Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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While the Court appropriately found that PSRs are outside salesmen for the 
purpose of the exemption, the Court dismissed the Department’s authority with 
damaging consequences. Courts will now be able to easily dismiss agency opinion 
by merely pointing to the “fair warning” standard developed in Christopher simply 
because there are one or more permissible interpretations, and cite lack of notice as 
the basis for not granting controlling deference. 
D. The Administrative Employee Exemption Is Not Ambiguous, Does Not Apply To 
PSRs, and Is Appropriate for Auer Deference Under Christopher 
The administrative employee exemption, in most cases, will not apply to PSRs 
because most PSRs do not exercise sufficient autonomy as required by the 
regulations. Employers usually strictly confine a PSR’s discretion in order to comply 
with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.160 Given the clear and unambiguous 
nature of the Department’s regulations (and the resulting obvious “fair warning”), 
the Christopher Court would likely find the Department’s interpretation deserving 
of Auer deference. However, granting controlling deference when an agency already 
has clear regulations is not important because the regulations already clearly set 
forth the agency’s opinion. 
1. Typical PSRs Do Not Meet All the Components of the Administrative Employee 
Exemption Clearly Defined by the Regulations 
The regulations set out three components to the exemption: (1) a minimum salary 
of $455 per week, or $23,751 a year; (2) a primary duty existing of office or non-
manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of 
the employer or the employer’s customers, where the execution of the duty requires 
the employee to exercise discretion; and (3) independent judgment.161 PSRs meet 
the minimum salary requirement, but are unlikely to satisfy the last two 
requirements. 
To meet the primary duty requirement an employee must perform work directly 
related to assisting the running or servicing of the business, as opposed to 
manufacturing or production.162 The regulations explicitly include work in 
functional areas such as advertising, marketing, and public relations.163 The detailing 
work performed by PSRs can be categorized in one, if not all, of those categories. In 
fact, the Third Circuit found this requirement easily met, noting that PSRs are 
 
 160. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2006). 
 161. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2012). 
 162. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2012). 
 163. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b). 
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required to form strategic plans designed to maximize sales in each PSRs’ respective 
territory.164 
The final requirement of discretion and independent judgment is more 
controversial. Employers restrain PSRs by limiting them to “scripts,” “core 
messages,” and pre-approved materials. Employers must limit the latitude of their 
employees because of limitations placed on the industry by federal law.165 For this 
reason, PSRs are not allowed to deviate from the script given to them by employers. 
Ultimately, whether a PSR exercises independent judgment is a fact-specific 
determination that needs to be made on a case-by-case basis. PSRs have discretion 
to determine which style and strategies to use with each physician, but it is not 
unusual for PSRs to go through extensive training provided by employers in order 
to learn many different kinds of skills and techniques.166 The regulations stipulate 
that merely applying varying well-established skills does not constitute exercising 
independent judgment.167 PSRs do have discretion about which physicians they 
meet with, how often, when, and where, but employers usually set minimum 
outreach requirements for which and how often physicians must be contacted.168 
In conclusion, because the regulations set forth a clear and obvious test for the 
administrative employee exemption, the Christopher Court would likely find “fair 
warning” of the obvious outcome of the Department’s interpretation and find Auer 
deference appropriate. However, such deference would be effectively meaningless 
because the Department’s opinion is already clearly articulated by the regulations. 
VI. Conclusion 
By holding the outside salesman exemption applied to PSRs, the Supreme Court of 
the United States held in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation that PSRs 
are not entitled to overtime pay.169 While this is a permissible finding under the 
 
 164. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the requirement was 
met because the business strategies developed by a PSR involve a high level of planning and foresight, and the 
strategic plan that Smith developed guided the execution of her remaining duties). 
 165. See Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 3–4; supra notes 46–47. 
 166. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 145 (2d. Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (“In the training program, a Rep is taught how to question 
physicians to determine why they may be hesitant about prescribing Novartis products and then to offer 
arguments to overcome their reluctance. Novartis instructs the Reps on four ‘social styles’ that a given 
individual may have in interacting with others and teaches the Reps how to tailor their presentations to a 
physician’s particular social style. Novartis has also hired consultants to observe its most successful Reps and 
incorporate their techniques into the training program.”). 
 167. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e) (2012) (mere “use of skill in applying well-established techniques, procedures or 
specific standards described in manuals or other sources” does not constitute an employee’s exercise discretion 
or independent judgment). 
 168. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 169. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2174 (2012). 
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existing laws, there is a danger in the Court’s reasoning for denying Auer deference. 
Courts may now use the “fair warning” standard as grounds for denying controlling 
deference to an agency for a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
simply because there is more than one permissible interpretation, and ignore the 
opinion for “lack of notice.” As a result, Christopher has the potential to degrade 
administrative agencies’ previously-recognized ability to interpret ambiguous 
regulations in legal briefs. 
 
